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Carlos Tiinnermann Bernheimtt
The United States of America is using armed force against Nicaragua
and intervening in Nicaragua's internal affairs on a daily basis. Since
1981, the U.S. has been waging a "covert" war against Nicaragua both in
violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political in-
dependence, and in violation of the most fundamental and universally
accepted principles of international law. From a legal standpoint, at the
minimum, the U.S. war against Nicaragua violates Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, which outlaws the use of force as an instrument
of national policy in international relations. Article 2(4) provides as fol-
lows: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations." 1 This prohibition was the Charter's great
departure from previous efforts to establish an international rule of law.2
It is the cornerstone of the normative and institutional system established
by the Charter. It has come to be recognized as ius cogens-an overrid-
ing and unmodifiable prohibitory norm.3
t This Article is based in part on the Memorial submitted by Nicaragua to the
International Court of Justice for consideration of the merits of Nicaragua's claim against the
United States. Memorial of Nicaragua, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985 I.C.J. Pleadings (Memorial presented Apr. 30,
1985) (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
"t Ambassador of Nicaragua to the United States.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
2. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10 ("The members of the League under-
take to repect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing
political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression. . . the
Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."). But see
General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand
Pact), opened for signature Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 2137.
3. Former President of the International Court of Justice Jimenez de Arechaga has writ-
ten, "[t]he paramount commitment of the Charter is Article 2, paragraph 4, which prohibits
the threat or use of force in international relations. This is the cardinal rule of international
law and the cornerstone of peaceful relations among States." Jimenez de Arechaga, Interna-
tional Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 HAGUE REcUEIL 9, 87 (1978). For a comment
on the prescriptive force of Article 2(4), see LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 217
(1961) (Article 2(4), among other provisions of the Charter, "purport[s] to create legal rights
and duties [and] possess[es] a constitutive or semi-legislative character, with the result that
...member States cannot 'contract out' of [it] or derogate from [it] . .. ."
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Article 2(4) was designed in part to prevent the type of trans-border
aggression that occurred in the recent world wars, but it was not confined
to this use. It had already become apparent at the time the Charter was
adopted that states, particularly the most powerful states, had the where-
withal for imposing their will on others by force, or by the threat of
force. The United States, the most powerful state, has sought to impose
its will on Nicaragua-in President Reagan's words, to force Nicaragua
to "say Uncle" 4-by attacks conducted by U.S. personnel and by U.S.
direction, support, and control of the mercenaries known as the contras.
These actions by the United States clearly violate Article 2(4).
It is the purpose of this Article to demonstrate, factually and legally,
how the U.S.-sponsored activities against Nicaragua violate Article 2(4).
Part I of this Article outlines the factual history, from 1981 to the pres-
ent, of the U.S. role in the funding, planning, and engagement of armed
force against Nicaragua. Part II analyzes the legal components of Nica-
ragua's charge that the U.S. actions violate Article 2(4). Specifically, this
section will show that the U.S. has used force against the territorial integ-
rity and political independence of Nicaragua within the meaning of Arti-
cle 2(4): (a) through the activities of its own military and intelligence
personnel; (b) by its actions in recruiting, organizing, training, supplying,
directing, and controlling a mercenary army whose activities have in-
cluded continuous and systematic depredations into the territory of Nic-
aragua with the object of overthrowing the government; and (c) in
adopting and ratifying the actions of the mercenary forces. Part III dem-
onstrates that the U.S. actions are not legitimate under Article 51 of the
UN Charter as an exercise of the right of self-defense. Finally, part IV
concludes that there is no other legal justification for these actions in
contravention of Article 2(4).
I. Historical Background
The general outlines of the U.S. covert war against Nicaragua are be-
yond dispute. United States armed forces and intelligence personnel
have mined Nicaragua's ports and conducted air and naval attacks on
targets within the territory of Nicaragua and within its territorial waters,
including attacks on oil storage tanks, pipelines, port facilities, and
merchant ships. The U.S. has also created an army of roughly 15,000
mercenaries (many of whom served the former dictator Anastasio
Somoza Debayle), installed them in base camps in Honduras along the
4. President's News Conference of Feb. 21, 1985, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 213
(Feb. 21, 1985).
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border with Nicaragua, trained them, paid them, supplied them with
arms, ammunition, food, and medical supplies, and directed their attacks
against human and economic targets inside Nicaragua. The U.S. has
openly acknowledged spending approximately $100 million on these ille-
gal activities since 1981. 5
At first, U.S. activities against Nicaragua were undertaken "covertly."
The intent was not to conceal them from Nicaragua, which could not be
unaware of repeated attacks across its own borders. Rather, the intent
was to hide the involvement of the U.S. from its own people and from the
world. This is in itself an implicit acknowledgement that these activities
cannot withstand legal or public scrutiny.
The objective of the United States' activities against Nicaragua is to
overthrow the Nicaraguan government. This has been true from the out-
set and was publicly acknowledged as early as July 1983, when the
Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
which oversees the "covert activites" against Nicaragua, reported to his
fellow legislators that "the purpose and the mission of the operation was
to overthrow the government in Nicaragua." '6
President Reagan, in November 1981, authorized the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) to recruit, train, supply, and direct a 1500-man
mercenary force to conduct hit-and-run raids against selected Nicara-
guan targets; $19,950,000 was then allotted for such purposes.7 By De-
cember 1982, not only was an additional $30 million allocated to the
program, but the force had also grown to 4,000 men, and the attacks
against Nicaraguan territory were occurring on an almost daily basis.,
By February 1983, the force had grown to 5,500 men.9 This number
increased to 7,000 by May 1983,10 and to 10,000 by July 1983.11 By the
spring of 1983, the hit-and-run raids had grown to large-scale assaults
intended to capture portions of Nicaraguan territory and establish a
"provisional government." 12
In September 1983, President Reagan authorized a further expansion
of the force to 12,000-15,000 men and a shift in tactics to emphasize
destruction of vital economic "targets."' 13 Another $24 million was
5. See infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text ($20 million in 1981, $30 million in 1982,
$24 million in 1983, and $27 million in 1985).
6. 129 CONG. REc. H5748 (daily ed. July 27, 1983) (statement of Rep. Boland).
7. Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
8. Wash. Post, May 8, 1983, at All, col. 1.
9. Wash. Post, May 8, 1983, at All, col. 3.
10. Id.
11. Wash. Post, July 14, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
12. Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 1984, at A14, col. 3.
13. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 20, col. 1.
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appropriated to finance these activities.'4 United States armed forces and
intelligence personnel then began to carry out air and naval attacks
against designated Nicaraguan economic installations. More than
nineteen such attacks were carried out in the first three months of 1984.5
During the same period, United States armed forces and intelligence per-
sonnel mined Nicaragua's three main ports: Corinto, Puerto Sandino,
and El Bluff.16 At least eight ships-five from third-party states-were
damaged or destroyed by exploding mines.' 7 As a result, Nicaragua's
capacity to carry on peaceful maritime commerce was seriously
impaired.' 8
In 1984 a supplemental source of funding for these activities was intro-
duced. Private individuals and groups within the United States were en-
couraged by the Reagan Administration to contribute financial and
material support to the mercenary army. More than $5 million was
raised in this manner,' 9 and private "volunteers," encouraged and as-
sisted by the Administration, began to provide support for the
mercenaries. 20
During 1984, attacks by mercenary forces and United States personnel
resulted in the death of 1,265 Nicaraguans, and in the destruction of cap-
ital facilities and production valued at more than $180 million. These
figures were significantly higher than in any previous year.
In June 1985, President Reagan persuaded the Congress to appropriate
another $27 million in aid,2' euphemistically termed "humanitarian,"
but in reality designed to carry on the military and paramilitary activities
against Nicaragua until at least.September 30, 1986. Even as this Arti-
cle is being written, the Administration has resumed its campaign for an
additional $100 million in aid to the mercenaries, including $70 million
in outright military aid.22 Indeed, President Reagan has made it clear
that the United States will continue to support its mercenary army no
matter what happens. When asked, "if the Congress [refused to appro-
priate more funds], will you look for some other avenue to help the
14. TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 19.
15. Wall St. 3., Mar. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
16. Id.
17. TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 19-20.
18. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at All, col.1 ("Two shipping companies have
stopped sailing to Nicaraguan ports as a result of the mining of the three main ports .
19. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
20. See Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1540, 98
Stat. 2492, 2637-38 (1984) (which permits the Defense Department to assist private groups by
sending donated supplies to Central America on military transport vehicles).
21. Act of Aug. 15, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, ch. V, 99 Stat. 293, 324-25 (1985).
22. President's Message to the Congress, Feb. 25, 1986, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
266 (Mar. 3, 1986).
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contras, some other way to continue your desire to see a restructuring of
the Nicaraguan Government," President Reagan responded, "we're not
going to quit and walk away from them no matter what happens. 23
In fact, President Reagan has openly announced that the use of U.S.
troops against Nicaragua is under consideration. A White House report
to Congress on April 3, 1985 stated: "Direct application of United States
military force, . . . must realistically be recognized as an eventual op-
tion, given our stakes in the region, if other policy alternatives fail."
24
It should be remembered that the United States has taken these actions
even though it is officially at peace with Nicaragua. No state of war
exists between the two countries. The United States recognizes the pres-
ent government of Nicaragua as the legitimate government, and the two
states maintain full diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the United States
has waged a relentless "covert" war against Nicaragua for over four
years.
The foregoing evidence demonstrates the broad extent of United States
actions against Nicaragua. As will be shown, these actions constitute the
threat and use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, for which the United States is liable under international law.
II. The Use of Force
A state violates Article 2(4) when it uses force or a threat of force
"against the territorial integrity or political independence" of another
state. The actions of the United States constituting the use of force
against Nicaragua are described below.
A. Direct Action by United States Personnel
In the first instance, U.S. armed forces and intelligence agents, of both
U.S. and Latin American nationality, have been involved in numerous
direct actions against Nicaragua. A few of the most egregious examples
are summarized below.
The mining of Nicaraguan harbors in early 1984 was a U.S. operation
from start to finish. The operation was approved by President Reagan on
the recommendation of White House National Security Advisor Robert
C. McFarlane. The actual mines were constructed in the United States
by the CIA and the U.S. Navy and were assembled in Honduras by CIA
23. Remarks Announcing the Central American Peace Proposal, Apr. 4, 1985, 21
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 418 (Apr. 8, 1985).
24. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
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weapons specialists.25 From a "mother ship"26 positioned off the coast of
Nicaragua, U.S. military and intelligence personnel, including Latin
American commandos from third countries hired and trained by the
CIA, deployed the mines in Nicaragua's harbors.27 As Senator Barry
Goldwater wrote in a letter to CIA Director William J. Casey dated
April 9, 1984, "the CIA had, with the written approval of the President,"
engaged in mining the Nicaraguan harbors. Senator Goldwater con-
cluded: "This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war.
For the life of me, I don't see how we are going to explain it. ' '28
A similar pattern of direct involvement of U.S. personnel marked a
series of raids on Corinto and other Nicaraguan ports in the early
months of 1984. Indeed, these attacks were staged from the same
"mother ship" used in the mining operations. During this period, United
States military personnel operated helicopters in combat against Nicara-
guan positions, while supplying air cover for commando raids against
Nicaraguan ports, harbors, and oil storage facilities.29
United States aircraft have also systematically violated Nicaraguan
airspace to conduct surveillance and to carry supplies to mercenary
forces. Jeane Kirkpatrick, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
acknowledged in a UN Security Council debate that as early as the be-
ginning of 1983, the United States was conducting regular reconnais-
sance flights over Nicaraguan territory.30
These direct incursions of U.S. personnel have been accompanied by a
continuous and deliberate campaign of intimidation by regular U.S. land,
naval and air forces along the borders of Nicaragua and in the seas off its
coast. This campaign has included a series of major maneuvers lasting
weeks or months and employing thousands of U.S. ground forces. This
campaign also involved almost continuous patrolling by naval task forces
and aircraft carrier groups, and the construction of permanent bases,
camps and airfields for these forces. U.S. military officers have reported
that U.S. armed forces are fully prepared, from a technical and logistical
25. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1984, at A4, col. 3.
26. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 20, col. 1.
27. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
28. 130 CONG. RIc. H2558-59 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1984).
29. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 20, col. 1 (publishing portions of an internal CIA
memorandum).
30. See 37 U.N. SCOR (2335th mtg.) at 48, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2335/corr.1 (1982). Such
flights were conducted by UH-1H helicopters, RC 135, U2, C-47, C-130 and AC-37 planes, as
well as by low-flying U.S. SR-71 Blackbirds that were deliberately used to cause sonic booms
and to intimidate the population. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
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standpoint, to carry out missions against Nicaragua.31 The Administra-
tion has announced that these maneuvers will continue at least through
1988. The purpose of these activities has not been hidden. At the high-
est levels, U.S. officials have repeatedly avowed that their intent is to put
"pressure" on the Nicaraguan government. 32 Indeed, in an example of
Orwellian "newspeak," U.S. officials have denominated this activity a
campaign of "perception management, ' 33 designed to keep the Nicara-
guan government and people in fear of a direct invasion by official U.S.
military forces. These maneuvers constitute what the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the Corfu Channel Case termed a "demonstra-
tion of force for the purpose of exercising political pressure. '34
Direct military action against Nicaragua, conducted by military and
civilian personnel in the official service of the United States, constitutes a
use of "armed force" under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
for which the United States is accountable. The actions of military and
civilian personnel of the United States in the line of duty and under the
direction of their superiors constitute, under law, the actions of the
United States. Indeed the acts and omissions of all state organs or agents
are attributable to the state.35 Thus, military activities conducted by
members of the armed forces of the United States or by other officers or
employees of the United States must be considered acts of the United
States for the purpose of determining its liability under international law.
Codes on international responsibility, prepared by bodies of experts
and individual jurists alike, uniformly accept the principle that the use of
force by organs or agents of a state becomes attached to that state for
purposes of determining the legal responsibility of the state. Among
these codes, the most authoritative is the International Law Commis-
sion's draft Articles on State Responsibility.36 Article 5 of that draft
states: "For the purposes of the present articles, conduct of any State
organ having that status under the internal law of that State shall be
considered as an act of the State concerned under international law, pro-
vided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question."' 37
Article 6 continues:
31. See Wash. Post, Feb 18, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
32. Wash. Post, July 22, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
33. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
34. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
35. See Ago, Third Report to the International Law Commission, [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 199, 246, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1971/Add.1 (Pt. One).
36. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1973] 2
Y.B. INT'L LAW COMM'N 161, 173-98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.I.
37. Id. at 191.
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The conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of that
State under international law, whether that organ belongs to the constitu-
ent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether its functions are
of an international or an internal character and whether it holds a superior
or a subordinate position in the organization of the State.38
The work of the International Law Commission simply reiterates long-
standing principles of international jurisprudence. As early as 1926, for
example, a draft Code of International Law prepared by Kokusaiho
Gakkwai provided in its first article that a state is liable for any "willful
act, default or neligence of the official authorities in the discharge of their
official functions."'39
And finally, as might be expected, the United States itself fully ac-
knowledges the principle that a state is liable for the use of force by its
officers or agents in violation of international law. In its "General Rule
as to Attribution" (of conduct to the state), the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law states:
Conduct of any organ or other agency of a state or of any official, em-
ployee, or other individual agent of the state or of such agency, that causes
injury to an alien, is attributable to the state. . . if it is within the actual or
apparent authority, or within the scope of the functions, of such agency or
individual agent.40
Since there is abundant evidence of pervasive direct participation by
U.S. forces and employees in attacks on Nicaragua, most of it publicly
admitted by responsible officials of the United States government, it fol-
lows that the rule holding a state legally accountable for the use of force
by its organs or agents is squarely applicable to the United States, and
thus that the United States has illegitimately used force against Nicara-
gua within the meaning of Article 2(4).
B. U.S. Support, Direction, and Control of the Mercenaries
From at least November 1981 to the present, the United States has
provided massive support to the "armed bands" operating continuously
38. Id. at 193. See also 1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens, prepared by the Harvard Law School, art. 15, [1969] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 145, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969/Add.1 (the state is liable for "the act or
omission of any organ, agency, official or employee of the State acting within the scope of the
actual or apparent authority or within the scope of the function of such organ, agency, official
or employee.").
39. 1926 Draft Code of International Law, [1969] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 141, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969/Add.I. For other examples of codes prepared by individual ju-
rists, see [1969] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 151-52, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969/Add.1.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 169 (1965).
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against the territory of Nicaragua. The aggregate amount of U.S. assist-
ance to the mercenary forces during this period, as admitted by official
U.S. sources, is not less than $97 million.41 This assistance began with
the recruitment of the mercenaries and extends to the overall direction
and control of their military and political strategy, the selection of mili-
tary and political leaders, their training-including instruction in terror-
ist tactics against Nicaraguan civilians-the construction and
maintenance of bases, logistical and intelligence support of operations
inside Nicaragua, and the planning of particular operations. Moreover,
the activities of the mercenary forces have been openly adopted and rati-
fied by President Reagan and other high U.S. officials.
The writings of jurists, the actions of the United Nations and the posi-
tions taken by the United States itself are in agreement that such use by a
State of armed groups of mercenaries or irregulars to carry out acts of
armed violence against another state violates the prohibition on the use
of force contained in Article 2(4). This position finds support, as well, in
the pronouncements of the International Court of Justice.
1. The Writings of Publicists
It is an elementary principle of international law that the direction and
control of armed bands by a state is attached to that state for purposes of
determining liability. The principle has been codified in draft form by
the International Law Commission. Article 8 of the draft Articles on
State Responsibility reads: "The Conduct of a person or group of persons
shall also be considered as an act of the State under international law if
(a) it is established that such person or group of persons was in fact act-
ing on behalf of that State ... "42
Publicists in international law agree on this attribution of the acts of
an agent to the state.43 Only a few of the most prominent authorities are
mentioned here. For example, Ian Brownlie notes that the terms "use of
force" and "resort to force," while frequently employed by writers, have
not undergone detailed analysis. 44 His own analysis, based on a survey of
the literature, concludes that:
41. See supra note 5.
42. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1974] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 277, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1 (Part One).
43. See, e.g., Ago, supra note 35, at 266, which states:
The attribution to the State, as a subject of international law, of the conduct of persons
who are in fact operating on its behalf or at its instigation (though without having ac-
quired the status of organs, either of the State itself or of a separate official institution
providing a public service or performing a public function) is unanimously upheld by the
writers on international law who have dealt with this question.
44. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 361 (1963).
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There can be little doubt that "use of force" is commonly understood to
imply a military attack, an "armed attack", by the organized military,
naval, or air forces of a state; but the concept in practice and principle has a
wider significance. The agency concerned cannot be confined to the mili-
tary and other forces under the control of a ministry of defence or war,
since the responsibility will be the same if a government acts through "mili-
tia", "security forces", or "police forces" which may be quite heavily armed
and may employ armoured vehicles. Moreover, governments may act by
means of completely "unofficial" agents, including armed bands, and "vol-
unteers", or may give aid to groups of insurgents in the territory of another
state.
45
Brownlie notes further that, although sporadic operations by armed
groups might not amount to armed attack, "it is conceivable that a co-
ordinated and general campaign by powerful bands or irregulars, with
obvious or easily proven complicity of the government of a state from
which they operate, would constitute an 'armed attack' .... 46
Rosalyn Higgins also takes the position that the use of irregulars to
carry out armed attacks against another state is, "from a functional point
of view," a use of force.47 She develops the historical background for the
growing emphasis on indirect uses of force in UN practice. At the San
Francisco Conference, she points out, the focus was on conventional
methods of armed attack, but "the unhappy events of the last fifteen
years" necessitated a substantial reevaluation of the concept of the use of
force.48 Thus, the "'law-making' activities" of the General Assembly
and the International Law Commission, defining and outlawing indirect
aggression, did not take place in vacuo, but arose from continuing efforts
to define aggression, the Nuremberg principles, and the stream of inci-
dents confronting the Security Council and the General Assembly.49
45. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
46. Id. at 278-79. Hans Wehberg reached the same conclusion in 1951. The application of
"physical" force, he maintained, is necessary for a violation of Article 2(4), but physical force
must be defined to include certain forms of indirect aggression:
[Lia force arm~e peut 8tre utilis6e non seulement directement, mais aussi indirectement,
par un "appui fourni aux bandes armies form6es sur le territoire d'un Etat et pin~trant
dans le territoire d'un autre Etat." Tolrer la formation de telles exp6ditions, ou aider une
r6volution qui a 6clat6 dans un autre pays, constitue i n'en pas douter un cas d'emploi
indirect de la force arm6e.
I1 faut done en tous cas, d'aprin Part. 2, par. 4, un recours i la "physical force".
Wehberg, L'interdiction du recours a la force; le principe et les problmes qui se posent, 78
HAGUE RECUEIL 1, 68-69 (1951) (footnote omitted).
47. Higgins, The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Prac-
tice, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 269, 278 (1961).
48. Id. at 288-89.
49. Id. at 290.
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Ahmed Rifaat also describes this evolving recognition of the dangers
of indirect uses of force. He points out that since 1945 states have with
growing frequency used armed bands and other covert uses of force in an
attempt to circumvent the prohibitions of Article 2(4).
States, while overtly accepting the obligation not to use force in their mu-
tual relations, began to seek other methods of covert pressure in order to
pursue their national policies without direct armed confrontation.
The incompatibility of the classical external armed aggression with the
present rules regulating international relations, led to the development of
other methods of covert or indirect aggression.50
These other covert methods include "subversion, fomenting of civil strife,
aiding armed bands or the sending of irregulars to assist rebel groups in
the target State."''s
Thus, there is now virtually an unanimous modem view concerning
indirect use of force through armed groups of mercenaries or irregulars.
Any legal doubts that may have existed prior to World War II were dis-
pelled by the events of the post-war period. If the prohibition on the use
of force in Article 2(4) is to have any meaning, it must cover this new
and dangerous mode of military activity by armed mercenaries and ir-
regulars. As Novogrod writes, "to argue that direct and indirect aggres-
sion could not equally be violations of Article 2(4) of the Charter would
be to make a fetish of literalism." 52
2. The Position of the United States
The United States has consistently been among the most forceful advo-
cates of the view that the use of armed groups by a state to carry out
military activities against another State amounts to a use of force. As
early as 1947, U.S. Representative Austin, in a statement to the Security
Council, condemned the support provided to guerrillas in Greece:
I do not think that we should interpret narrowly the "Great Charter" of
the United Nations. In modem times, there are many ways in which force
can be used by one State against the territorial integrity of another. Inva-
sion by organized armies is not the only means for delivering an attack
against a country's independence. Force is effectively used today through
devious methods of infiltration, intimidation and subterfuge.
But this does not deceive anyone. No intelligent person in possession of
the facts can fail to recognize here the use of force, however devious the
50. A. RiFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 217 (1979).
51. Id. See also Novogrod, Indirect Aggression, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 199 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); E. ARONEANU, LA DEFINITION
DE L'AGRESSION 89-91 (1958); Piotrowski, 012 en Sommes-Nous Sur le Probleme de
l'Agression, 35 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 411, 415 (1957).
52. Novogrod, supra note 51, at 227.
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subterfuge may be. We must recognize what intelligent and informed citi-
zens already know. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, in supporting guer-
rillas in northern Greece, have been using force against the territorial
integrity and political independence of Greece. They have in fact been
committing acts of the very kind which the United Nations was designed to
prevent, and have violated the most important of the basic principles upon
which our Organization was founded.53
Similarly, in 1969, John Lawrence Hargrove, the U.S. Representative
to the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, stated:
The Charter. . .does not differentiate among the various kinds of illegal
force. . . .There is simply no provision in the Charter, from start to fin-
ish, which suggests that a State can in any way escape or ameliorate the
Charter's condemnation of illegal acts of force against another State by a
judicious selection of means to its illegal ends. 54
The same view was espoused in 1973 by Judge Schwebel, currently a
member of the I.C.J., who also served as U.S. Representative to the Spe-
cial Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. Writing a year
before the Definition of Aggression was adopted, he afrmed "that the
Charter of the United Nations makes no distinction between direct and
indirect uses of force," and argued that the "most pervasive forms of
modern aggression tend to be indirect ones."' 55 Judge Schwebel then re-
ferred to the frequently cited Report of the Secretary-General which states
that "[t]he characteristic of indirect aggression appears to be that the
aggressor State, without itself committing hostile acts as a State, operates
through third parties who are either foreigners or nationals seemingly
acting on their own initiative. '56
3. The Practice of United Nations
The consistent practice of the United Nations confirms the proposition
that substantial involvement in the activities of armed insurgent groups is
a violation of the prohibition against the use of force in Article 2(4). The
UN concerned itself from the outset with the definition and elaboration
of the concept of "the use of force" contained in the Charter. A series of
resolutions and other actions defining or condemning the use of force and
aggression shows a gradual evolution from the general characterization
of support for insurgent groups as unlawful to specific condemnations
53. 2 U.N. SCOR (147th and 148th mtgs.) at 1120-21 (1947).
54. Statement by John Lawrence Hargrove, United States representative to the Special
Committeee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Mar. 25, 1969, in Schwebel, Aggression,
Intervention and Self-Defence in Modem International Law, 136 HAGUE RECUEIL 411, 458
(1972).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 455-56 (quoting the Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doe A/2211, at 72).
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invoking Article 2(4). The Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of States, adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949,
imposed a duty on states "to refrain from fomenting civil strife in the
territory of another State, and to prevent the organization within its ter-
ritory of activities calculated to foment such civil strife."' 57 Similarly, the
Commission's Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind included among the enumerated offenses:
(4) The incursion into the territory of a State from the territory of another
State by armed bands for a political purpose.
(5) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of ac-
tivities calculated to foment civil strife in another State, or the toleration by
the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to foment civil
strife in another State. 58
The General Assembly, too, has repeatedly condemned the use of force
by states acting through insurgent groups. In its 1950 Peace Through
Deeds Resolution, the Assembly denounced "the intervention of a State
in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of changing its
legally established government by the threat or use of force."'5 9 The Res-
olution went on to say: "[W]hatever the weapon used, any aggression,
whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a
Foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace
and security throughout the world."' 60
The Assembly's position on the use of armed insurgent groups was
further refined in the 1970 Declaration concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States.61 The first principle enunciated in the
Declaration is the prohibition against the use of force, including the very
forms of involvement with the activities of armed bands that characterize
the U.S. relationship with the contras:
57. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, art. 4, 4 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/925 (1949).
58. Draft Code on Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the
International Law Commisssion to the General Assembly, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11,
U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 112, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add. 1.
59. G.A. Res. 380, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
60. Id. See also Essentials of Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 290, U.N. Doc. A/1251 at 13
(1949); 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
61. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (adopted without vote on
Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations].
Vol. 11:104, 1985
U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the
organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for
incursion into the territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph
involve a threat or use of force.62
The United Nation's development of principles in this area culminated
with the adoption in 1974 of Resolution 3314, a Definition of Aggres-
sion. 63 Article 1 of the Definition defines aggression as "the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State." 64 Thus the Definition of Aggression is
again directly and explicitly related to the use of force prohibited by Arti-
cle 2(4) of the Charter. Article 3 of the Definition specifies certain acts
that shall "qualify as an act of aggression," i.e., that constitute the use of
force in violation of Article 2(4). Among these, and of specific applica-
tion in the present context, Article 3(g) includes: "The sending by or on
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein." 65
The Soviet Union made a proposal to include subparagraph 3(g) under
the separate label of "indirect aggression."' 66 In the final Definition, how-
ever, subparagraph 3(g) was included without differentiating it from
other, more overt forms of aggression. The Special Committee accepted
62. Id. at 123. According to Judge Lachs of the I.C.J., "indirect means of attacking States
were barred" by this Declaration. Lachs, The Development and General Trends of Interna-
tional Law in Our Time, 169 HAGUE RECUEIL 10, 166 (1980). Similarly, former President of
the I.C.J. Jimenez de Arechaga asserts that the 1970 Declaration concerning Friendly Rela-
tions constitutes an "important interstitial development of some of the implications of Article
2(4)." Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 3, at 93. He finds the origins of the Declaration in the
increasing use of methods of indirect aggression since 1945, in the sense of "the sending of
irregular forces or armed bands or the support or encouragement given by a government to
acts of civil strife in another State." Id. Recognizing that "these acts may involve the use of
force," he argues that the purpose of the Declaration was simply to prevent states from doing
"indirectly what they are precluded by the Charter from doing directly." Id.
63. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N.
Doc A/9631 (1974) (endorsed by the Sixth Committee (Legal), and adopted by the General
Assembly by consensus on Dec. 14, 1974).
64. Id. at 143.
65. Id. See also Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the
Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 78, U.N. Doc.
A/36/51 (1981).
66. Draft Proposal Submitted by the U.S.S.R., Report of the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 56, U.N. Doc. A/8019
(1970).
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the proposition that the UN Charter provides no basis for distinguishing
between a state using force by acting on its own and a state using force by
acting through armed insurgent groups. 67 The Definition thus condemns
the sending of armed bands as a use of force on par with direct invasion,
bombardment, blockade, or other traditional notions of armed
aggression. 68
4. The Criteria for State Liability
Subparagraph 3(g) of the UN Definition of Aggression specifically cov-
ers both the sending of armed bands "by or on behalf" of a state, and
"substantial involvment" in the acts of armed groups. This outcome was
a compromise between the position of the Western states, led by the
United States, and the position of several Third World countries. The
U.S. originally insisted that the prohibition only against the "sending" of
armed groups was too narrow.69 An earlier Western draft would have
condemned, as well, the "[o]rganizing, supporting or directing of armed
bands or irregular or volunteer forces that make incursions or infiltrate
into another State." 70 Similarly, in 1972 the U.S. proposed adding the
following to the list of examples of the use of armed force:
The organization by a State, or encouragement of the organization of, or
assistance to, irregular forces or armed bands or other groups, volunteers,
or mercenaries, which participate in incursions into another State's terri-
tory or in the carrying out of acts involving the use of force in or against
another State, or knowing acquiescence in organized activities within its
own territory directed toward and resulting in the commission of such
acts.71
Many nations of the Third World, in contrast, objected to such an
expansive prohibition on aid to armed bands; they sought to include in
3(g) only the actual sending of armed groups against another state.72 If
3(g) was read too broadly, these nations feared it might condemn assist-
ance to indigenous groups engaged in struggles for self-determination
against colonial powers.73
67. See Declaration concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 61; see also J. STONE, CON-
FLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED STATES APPROACHES TO AGGRESSION 89 (1977).
68. Definition of Aggression, supra note 63, art. 3.
69. See 2 B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 39 (1975).
70. Draft Proposal submitted by Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, Report of the Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 60,
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981).
71. 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/9019 (1973).
72. See Report of the Sixth Committee, 28 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 95) para.
22, U.N. Doc. A/9411 (1973); 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 69, at 40.
73. See J. STONE, supra note 67, at 81-83.
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The final language of subparagraph 3(g) emerged as a compromise be-
tween these two positions.74 The Definition starts by condemning the
"sending" of armed groups. The U.S. language condemning the "or-
ganizing, supporting, or directing" of armed groups was dropped. In-
stead, the prohibition was extended to "substantial involvement" in the
activities of the armed groups.
Both elements of the UN Definition are broadly supported by the writ-
ings of publicists.75 In addition, the World Court has made it clear that
adoption or ratification alone of the acts of non-governmental actors
makes those actions attributable to the state.76
a. Direction and Control
It is well established, and indeed common sense, that the actual direc-
tion and control of irregular armed bands by a state give rise to liability
of that state for their actions.77 In discussing the activities of rebels in a
civil war, Brownlie writes: "If rebels are effectively supported and con-
trolled by another state that state is responsible for a 'use of force' as a
consequence of the agency."' 78 This point, however, is not limited merely
to civil wars. It applies to all uses of force. The particular composition
of the actual attackers is inconsequential. Thus, even "[Ihe use of volun-
teers under governmental control for launching a military campaign or
supporting active rebel groups will undoubtedly constitute a 'use of
force.' It is the question of government control and not the label 'volun-
teer' or otherwise which is important. ' 79 Whether a state controls and
directs the activities of the armed groups depends on the facts of the
particular situation. In discussing the factors that determine whether or
not a state has control over a group of alleged volunteers, Brownlie lists
the following: "numbers, central direction, size of offensive launched,
and identification of formations and divisions,.. . source of equipment,
the origin of the command under which the forces operate, and an ab-
sence of disavowal by the government of the state of origin."80
74. See id. at 75; 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 69, at 40.
75. See, e.g., infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
76. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Ago, supra note 35, at 262-67.
78. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 370 (emphasis in original).
79. d at 371-72 (footnote omitted). This emphasis on direction or control is shared by
other publicists. As Piotrowski writes, "l'emploi de la force par voie d'une action organisie d
l'intirieur du pays d I'aide de l'Etat itranger, au moyen de saboteurs, instructeurs, meneurs et
techniciens de provenance dtrangire ou instruits d l'dtranger, constitue bien un casus d'agression
indirecte." Piotrowski, supra note 51 (emphasis in original); see also E. ARONEANU, supra
note 51, at 91-92.
80. Brownlie, Volunteers and the Law of War and Neutrality, 5 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 570,
574 (1956) (footnote omitted).
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Under Brownlie's analysis, the United States has exercised and is exer-
cising control over the activities of the mercenary forces in Nicaragua,
and is thus using force against Nicaragua. Each of the factors Brownlie
cites is present. Although the mercenaries represent a large, well-organ-
ized force of 15,000 men,81 and their offensives often involve several hun-
dred soldiers,8 2 the "central direction" of the mercenary forces has come
from Washington. 3 Their equipment comes primarily from the United
States, either directly or funneled through a network of third parties.8 4
Indeed, the United States exercises direction and control at every level of
the mercenary army's activities, from the most minute details of the be-
havior and performance of individual mercenaries, to the broadest issues
of deciding what goals to pursue and how to achieve them.
At the command level, the United States determines the leadership of
the mercenary army. In 1982, the U.S. decided that the mercenary
forces needed to "repackage" the mercenary leadership to improve its
political image.85 Accordingly, it interviewed candidates, selected the
new leaders, and unveiled them in a press conference in Miami in De-
cember, 1982.86 The U.S. told the mercenary leaders what they should
say in public in order to make a favorable impression on Congress and
the American people.87 The U.S. paid the mercenary leaders and housed
many of them in Miami.88 For those mercenary leaders based in Central
America, the CIA devised plans to resettle them in the U.S. should such
a contingency become necessary.89 Finally, leaders who displeased the
U.S. were dismissed. 90
At the organizational level, the United States has recruited merce-
naries and set the pay scale of leaders and foot soldiers alike.91 More-
over, the U.S. has regulated the size of the mercenary forces and has
established both the amount and the pace of growth. 92 Every major in-
crease in the size of the mercenary forces has reflected a policy decision
made in Washington.93 The Reagan Administration's initial request for
81. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
82. See, eg., Brody, Attack by the Nicaraguan "Contras" on the Population of Nicaragua
23 (Mar. 1985) (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
83. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
84. Id.; N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
85. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
86. Id.; L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1985, at I1, col. 1.
87. L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1985, at I1, col. 1.
88. Wall St. J., Mar 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
89. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
90. Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 1984, at A14 col. 4.
91. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
92. Id.; L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1985, at Il, col. 1.
93. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
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congressional funding in late 1981 called for a force of 500 mercenaries. 94
In the fall of 1982, the CIA recommended a substantial increase in mer-
cenary force levels. 95 By the end of 1984, the CIA had achieved this goal
by expanding the force to 15,000 men.96 In the summer of 1985, the
Administration persuaded Congress to provide $27 million in "humani-
tarian" aid to the mercenaries; the new funding was promptly followed
by an upsurge in mercenary attacks.
At the operational level, the United States has directed and continues
to direct the training of the mercenary forces by CIA personnel.97 U.S.
advisors instruct the mercenaries generally on the principles of guerrilla
warfare, and specifically on what weapons to use and how to use them. 98
Through the Psychological Warfare Manual and the CIA sabotage book-
let, The Freedom Fighter's Manual, the U.S. has even sought to advise
the mercenaries as to how they should act. 99 U.S. advisors help the mer-
cenaries plan their missions and often accompany them, assuming super-
visory roles."l° Finally, the U.S. does not allow the mercenaries to
control their own weapons or logistics.10'
At the tactical level, the United States has exerted control over the
mercenaries. The CIA originally urged the mercenaries to launch con-
ventional attacks in an attempt to seize and hold Nicaraguan territory. 10 2
Later, the U.S. decided that guerrilla tactics would be more effective
against Nicaragua and told the mercenaries to change their tactics ac-
cordingly. 103 In addition, the CIA has selected targets for the mercenary
raids and directed air strikes against these targets.1°4 It has also in-
structed the mercenaries on which methods of violence they should em-
ploy.105 In sum, the day-to-day conduct of the war has been directed by
CIA personnel under the overall supervision of CIA Director William
Casey.106 Indeed, as one Administration official remarked, "It's really
Casey's war." 107
94. L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at Il, col. 1.
95. Wash. Post, May 5, 1983, at Al, col. 1; Wash. Post, May 8, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
96. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
97. Id.; Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
98. See L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at I1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1984, at A6, col. 3.
99. See CIA, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE (Cong. Research
Service trans. 1984) (on file with the Yale Journal ofInternational Law); CIA, THE FREEDOM
FIGHTER'S MANUAL (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
100. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1983, at Al, col. 4.
101. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
102. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
103. L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1985, at Il, col. 1; Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1984, at A24, col. 2.
104. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 20, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 3, 1984, at All, col. I.
105. See CIA, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE, supra note 99.
106. Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
107. Id.
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At the level of military strategy, the United States has dictated a pro-
gram of sabotage and decided upon the class of targets it wishes the mer-
cenaries to attack. It has also chosen when and where the mercenaries
should launch invasions into Nicaragua.10 8
At the level of political and organizational strategy, the United States
has worked to unite the opposing factions of mercenaries and to improve
their political image.109 In addition, the U.S. has formulated a plan to
cripple the Nicaraguan economy. 110 Also, it made the decision to em-
bark on a program of psychological warfare.11
Close control over the activities of the mercenaries has been an essen-
tial element of U.S. policy. Administration officials have repeatedly as-
sured Congress that the United States is in control. In December 1982,
for example, one of the aides to CIA Director Casey testified that the
CIA had "firm control" over the mercenary operation.112 The U.S. has
taken decisive steps to maintain this control. After Argentina pulled its
advisors out of the mercenary operation, the U.S. decided to manage the
program directly and sent in its own advisors.113 From that time on, the
U.S. has steadily increased the number of these advisors.1 14 On occasion,
American helicopters, flown by U.S. personnel, have been used to obtain
better command and control at the operational level. 115 Furthermore,
the CIA has threatened to withhold supplies and training unless the mer-
cenaries accept its advice.116
U.S. direction and control of contra operations is so complete that, as
former contra leader Edgar Chamorro stated in testimony presented to
the I.C.J.:
When I agreed to join the F.D.N. in 1981, I had hoped that it would be an
organization of Nicaraguans, controlled by Nicaraguans, and dedicated to
our own objectives which we ourselves would determine. I joined on the
understanding that the United States Government would supply us the
means necessary to defeat the Sandinistas and replace them as a govern-
ment, but I believed that we would be our own masters. I turned out to be
mistaken. The F.D.N. turned out to be an instrument of the United States
Government and, specifically, of the C.I.A. It was created by the C.I.A., it
was supplied, equipped, armed and trained by the C.I.A. and its activities-
both political and military-were directed and controlled by the C.I.A.
108. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
110. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1985, at 1, col. I (mining of harbors designed to "stop shipping in
Nicaragua").
111. See CIA, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE, supra note 99.
112. Wash. Post, May 8, 1983, at All, col. 1.
113. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
114. L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1985, at I1, col. 1.
115. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
116. N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
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Those Nicaraguans who were chosen (by the C.I.A.) for leadership posi-
tions within the organization-namely, Calero and Bermudez-were those
who best demonstrated their willingness to unquestioningly follow the in-
structions of the C.I.A. They, like the organization itself, became nothing
more than executioners of the C.I.A.'s orders. The organization became so
thoroughly dependent on the United States Government and its continued
support that, if that support were terminated, the organization would not
only be incapable of conducting any military or paramilitary activities
against Nicaragua, but it would immediately begin to disintegrate. It could
not exist without the support and direction of the United States
Government.1 17
b. Substantial Involvement
The second branch of the concept of aggression embodied in para-
graph 3(g) of the Assembly's definition-that of "substantial involve-
ment" in the use of armed force against another state-finds equally
broad support. The principle goes at least as far back as the historic
Alabama Claims Arbitration decided in 1872.118 In that case, Great
Britain was charged with outfitting, arming, equipping, and supplying
Confederate cruisers during the American Civil War to prey on Union
shipping. As a result of Great Britain's substantial involvement in thi§
activity, the tribunal awarded "a sum of $15,500,000 in gold, as the in-
demnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States."' 1 9
The same position was confirmed more recently by the former Presi-
dent of the I.C.J., Jimenez de Arechaga. He asserted that states "violate
the prohibition on the use of force [when they] organize, instigate, assist
or participate in 'acts of civil strife.' ",120
Of course, the U.S. direction and control of the mercenaries' paramili-
tary activities against Nicaragua described above121 constitute, afortiori,
"substantial involvement" in the mercenaries' operations. The intimate
involvement of the U.S. is also demonstrated by its role in furnishing the
men, money, materiel, and support facilities essential to the mercenaries'
operations.
The United States has provided men for the mercenary movement by
recruiting in Honduras and in the United States and by training soldiers
117. Affidavit of Edgar Chamorro (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985 I.C.J. Pleadings (Case Concern-
ing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua) (Affidavit dated Sept. 5,
1985) (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
118. 1 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 653 (1898).
119. Id. at 658.
120. Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 3, at 115; see also Schachter, The Right of States to
Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1641 (1984).
121. See supra notes 77-117 and accompanying text.
Yale Journal of International Law
once they enlist. 22 The role of the U.S. has been even more central in
financing the mercenary program; it has openly allocated and supervised
the expenditure of approximately $100 million from 1981 to the pres-
ent. 123 Each new congressional authorization of funds for the program
has resulted in a surge of mercenary activities.124 Conversely, congres-
sional refusals to continue funding have been followed by dire assertions
that the mercenary movement cannot survive without U.S. support. 125
The materiel furnished by the United States ranges from helicopters
and combat planes to small arms to uniforms and boots. 126 Military
hardware that was originally the property of the U.S. Air Force was
transferred to the mercenaries through the CIA.1 27 Furthermore, the
U.S. has encouraged and assisted private groups in funnelling war sup-
plies to the mercenaries. 128 To move the equipment to the mercenaries-
both that provided by the CIA and that furnished by private U.S.
groups-the United States has conducted large lift operations involving
Navy ships, Air Force planes, and at least one private cargo airline. 29
In addition, the United States has furnished the mercenaries with sup-
port facilities. In Honduras, there has been a massive effort to improve
military installations such as army bases and airfields, many of which
have been used by the mercenaries.130 Moreover, the United States has
put sophisticated intelligence facilities at their disposal to conduct sur-
veillance of the Nicaraguan forces.' 3 '
Subparagraph 3(g) of the Assembly's Definition of Aggression says
that, in order to qualify as "aggressive," acts carried out by armed
groups must be "of such gravity as to amount to"1 32 invasion or attack,
military occupation, bombardment, blockade of the ports or coast of a
state, and the like. Thus minor incidents are not considered a use of
force under the rubric of subparagraph 3(g).' 33 There can be, however,
no doubt that the mercenaries' activities fall within the prohibition of
3(g). To recite only gross figures, the military attacks of the mercenaries
have resulted in over 3,600 Nicaraguans killed, over 9,200 maimed,
122. Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
123. See supra note 5.
124. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1984, at A10, col. 1.
125. See President's News Conference of May 22, 1984, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
747 (May 22, 1984).
126. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 6; Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 6;
Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
127. See supra note 126; see also N.Y. Times, July 25, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
128. Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1984, at Al, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
129. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
130. Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1985, at A27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
131. TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 27, col. 2.
132. Definition of Aggression, art. 3(g), supra note 63.
133. See A. RIFAAT, supra note 50, at 274.
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wounded, raped, or kidnapped, and enormous amounts of property dam-
age. 134 Without a doubt, the standard of substantial U.S. involvement in
the activities of the mercenaries has been fully satisfied.
c. Adoption and Ratification
Finally, the United States, on the highest authority, has repeatedly
adopted, ratified, and approved the acts of the mercenary forces in and
against Nicaragua. One of the most extreme examples is President Rea-
gan's affirmation in a radio address on February 16, 1985, that "[t]hey
are our brothers. . . . [T]heir fight is our fight." 135
Under international law, such adoption and ratification constitutes still
another basis for attributing the actions of the mercenaries to the United
States for the purpose of determining its legal liability. In the Case Con-
cerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Inter-
national Court of Justice said:
[T]he policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining
the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages
for the purpose of exerting pressure on the United States Government, was
complied with by other Iranian authorities and endorsed by them repeat-
edly in statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy was
fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created by the
occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular
staff as hostages. The approval given to these acts by the Ayatollah
Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to perpet-
uate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention
of the hostages into acts of that State. 136
The President's statement of February 16, 1985, is the most striking of
the many statements by senior administration officials adopting, approv-
ing and ratifying the activities of the mercenaries against Nicaragua.
President Reagan himself repeatedly refers to these mercenaries as "free-
dom fighters" and tells the American public that it has a duty to support
them. 137
Indeed, these ratifications go beyond the actions of the mercenaries
themselves. The Administration has also encouraged and facilitated the
activities of private parties in supplying men, money, and materiel to
mercenary forces in the field. Two American citizens (one a member of
the Alabama Air National Guard) who had joined the mercenaries by
134. L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1986, at V5, col. 1.
135. Radio Address to the Nation, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 187 (Feb. 16, 1985).
136. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 35 (Judgment of May 24).
137. See Radio Address to the Nation, supra note 135, at 186-87.
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this route were killed in a helicopter attack on Nicaraguan territory. 138
When challenged on these matters by the press, President Reagan de-
fended and embraced these private actions as "quite in line with what has
been a pretty well established tradition in this country." 139
In this manner, the United States, by adopting, approving, and ratify-
ing the acts of the mercenary forces and the private efforts to support and
assist them, has "translated" their acts and conduct "into the acts of the
State." 14o
C. Use of Force Violates "Territorial Integrity and Political
Independence"
The phrase "against the territorial integrity or the political indepen-
dence of any State" was inserted in the text of Article 2(4) precisely to
ensure that the illegality of the use of force against either of these sover-
eign attributes would be indisputable. This provision was intended to
safeguard the continued sovereign existence of member states.
The Dumbarton Oaks draft of the UN Charter contained no specific
reference to political independence and territorial integrity as essential
attributes of national sovereignty.1 41 The omission did not go unnoticed
however. In comments submitted prior to the San Francisco Conference,
many of the smaller states, including virtually all of the Latin American
states, proposed amendments designed to ensure the explicit protection
of these attributes in the Charter.142
The amendment finally adopted was proposed by Australia.1 43 The
Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Francis M. Forde, after reviewing the sub-
stance of the proposed amendment, stated the rationale for it as follows:
"The application of this principle should insure that no question relating
to a change of frontiers or an abrogation of a state's independence could
be decided other than by peaceful negotiation."' 144
138. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1984, at A12, col. 1.
139. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1984, at A15, col. 1.
140. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 35 (Judgment of May 24).
141. See Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization, ch. II,
para. 4, Doc. 1, G/l, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 1, 3 (1945).
142. See Doc. 215, 1/1/19, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 557-68 (1945) (list by states of proposed
amendments to ch. II).
143. Doc. 382, 1/1/19, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 303 (1945).
144. Doc. 20, P/6, 1 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 174 (1945). This rationale was echoed by Dr.
Herbert Evatt, Minister for External Affairs and head of the Australian Delegation. H. Ev-
ATr, THE UNrrED NATIONS 18-19 (1948).
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There can be no question that the use of force by the United States, as
described above, is against both "the territorial integrity" and "the polit-
ical independence" of Nicaragua. The U.S. has deliberately violated Nic-
araguan airspace hundreds of times-often with high-performance
aircraft for the purpose of producing sonic booms to intimidate the popu-
lation-and has admitted to having intruded with armed vessels into
Nicaraguan territorial waters. It is self-evident that these actions are, as
a matter of law, flagrant assaults on Nicaragua's territorial integrity.
Similarly, the U.S. actions in supporting the mercenaries are openly
and unequivocally directed against the "political independence" of Nica-
ragua. As defined by Professor Myres S. McDougal:
Impairment of "political independence" . . . involves substantial curtail-
ment of the freedom of decision-making [of the target state] through the
effective and drastic reduction of the number of alternative policies open at
tolerable costs to the officials of that state. It may further consist of an
attempt to reconstruct the process of decision in the target state, to modify
the composition or membership of the ruling elite group, and, perhaps, to
dislodge that group completely and substitute another more acceptable to
the attacking state. 145
The foregoing quotation is a strikingly accurate description of the ad-
mitted objectives of U.S. policy in Nicaragua. The United States has
frankly stated that its objective in supporting the mercenaries is to over-
throw the Nicaraguan government. Two years ago, the U.S. Ambassa-
dor to Nicaragua, Anthony C. Quainton, stated that the object of U.S.
policy was "to try and modify [the] behavior [of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment] in some substantial ways which are consistent with our interest
and our vital security concerns throughout Central America."' 146 This
same formula-maintaining pressure to force a change in Nicaraguan
policies-has been reiterated repeatedly by U.S. officials, including Presi-
dent Reagan, as the objective of the elaborately orchestrated U.S. pro-
gram of activity. It should be recalled that this program of coercion
includes not only the actual use of force, but also almost continuous mili-
tary maneuvers by thousands of U.S troops near Nicaragua's borders and
powerful naval flotillas off its shores. The U.S admits that these military
operations are part of a program of "perception management" designed
to intimidate the Nicaraguan government and keep it on continuous alert
against a possible direct invasion by U.S. forces.147 Military deployments
145. McDougal & Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggres-
sion and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J. 1057, 1101 (1959). See also Jimenez
de Arechaga, supra note 3, at 113.
146. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
147. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at Al, col. 2; Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1984, at A33, col. 6.
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are backed up by economic pressures such as: (a) the termination of all
economic assistance to Nicaragua in 1981 and the repudiation of a $9.8
million food credit; 148 (b) the 90-percent cut in the Nicaraguan sugar
quota in 1983, officially determined to be a violation of U.S. international
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT); 14 9 (c) the veto of support by multilateral financial agencies such
as the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank;150 and (d) the trade embargo imposed on May 1, 1985.151 In
light of the above actions and the stated purposes behind these actions,
there can scarcely be a clearer instance of a use of force directed against
the political independence of another state.
III. The Use of Force by the United States against Nicaragua Cannot
Be Justified as an Exercise of Self-Defense
Although the United States refused to defend its actions before the
International Court of Justice, some Administration officials have at-
tempted to justify U.S. support for the contras on various ill-defined theo-
ries of self-defense. For a considerable time, the United States publicly
maintained the fiction that the purpose of its armed actions and support
for the mercenaries was to interdict traffic in arms allegedly proceeding
from Nicaragua to rebels fighting against the government of El Salvador.
Occasional remarks by U.S. officials have referred to such interdiction as
an exercise of the right of collective self-defense, presumably in associa-
tion with El Salvador. 152
As will be shown herein, the allegations made by the United States,
even if true, would not support a self-defense claim under Article 51 of
the UN Charter and thus would not constitute an exception to Article
2(4) of the Charter prohibiting the use of force. Given the policy orienta-
tion of the Reagan Administration, such a claim would not only be disin-
genuous, but it would also lack legal force for failing to meet the armed
force attack and reporting requirements of Article 51.
The prohibition against the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter
is categorical. The only exception to this prohibition, other than collec-
tive measures authorized by the Security Council, is the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense in case of armed attack, preserved
148. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1984, at A10, col. 1.
149. 28 GATT Focus, Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 1; see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1984, at AI0,
col. 2.
150. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1984, at A10, col. 2.
151. Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985).
152. Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1984, at A18, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
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under and restricted by Article 51.153 This general view of the interrela-
tionship between Article 2(4) and Article 51 has the overwhelming sup-
port of international law publicists around the world.154
The classic example of an impermissible use of force under this view is
the attempt to overthrow or coerce the government of another state that
is for some reason not acceptable to the acting state. Whatever may be
the extent of the self-defense exception, it cannot be stretched to cover
the use of force for this purpose.
Even the minority of publicists who contend that Article 51 does not
define or limit the right of self-defense, but simply preserves a pre-ex-
isting right, agree that the very concept of self-defense is inconsistent
with the use of force against the political independence of another state.
Bowett, who is perhaps the leading exponent of this non-restrictive view
of Article 51, agrees that the core of the concept is the protection of
"essential rights from irreparable harm in circumstances in which alter-
native means of protection are unavailable." 155 In no sense can the use
of force by the United States against the political independence of Nica-
ragua over the last four years be regarded as the only available means of
protecting essential rights from irreparable harm.
More frequently, proponents of a non-restrictive view of Article 51
define self-defense with respect to Daniel Webster's well-known formula-
tion in the Caroline case: a government alleging self-defense must show a
"necessity of self-defense [that is] instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."' 156
Here again it is evident that there is not now and never has been any
threat by Nicaragua to the United States or any other country necessitat-
ing an instant, reflexive response. Under the Caroline formula there
must be "no moment for deliberation," but the United States has had
more than four years to deliberate about "the choice of means" for its
Nicaragua policy. After first considering the open use of military force
153. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 415 (1963).
154. See, e.g., Badr, The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility, 10 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (1980); Bishop, General Course of Public International Law, 115
HAGUE RECUEIL 151, 436-37 (1965); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 81, 278; L. HENKIN,
How NATIONS BEHAVE 136-37 (1968); H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
797 (1966); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1952);
Skubiszkewski, The Postwar Alliances of Poland and the United Nations Charter, 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 613, 619-22 (1959); Verdross, Iddes Directrices de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, 83
HAGUE RECUEIL 1, 14-15 (1953); Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 AM. J. INT'L L.
514, 529 (1956).
155. D. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1958).
156. The Caroline Case, 2J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 412 (1906).
See also Higgins, supra note 47, at 301-02; Schachter, supra note 120, at 1633-45; Waldock,
The Use of Force in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 455, 496-98 (1952).
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to achieve its objectives, the decision was made to organize and deploy
the mercenaries, then to supplement their efforts with the mining of the
Nicaraguan harbors and direct attacks by CIA employees and hired sab-
oteurs against targets inside Nicaragua, and ultimately to expand the
guerrilla force to 15,000 men and to engage in a policy of intimidation
and "perception management." 157 Over this entire period, the United
States has-in a measured, calculated and deliberate manner-steadily
intensified the application of force against Nicaragua. For this reason,
the Caroline formula can find no application in this case.
Public admissions by U.S. officials make clear that under any interpre-
tation of Article 51, U.S. actions against Nicaragua over the last four
years cannot have been taken in self-defense. The United States has re-
peatedly, unequivocally,.and on the highest authority acknowledged that
its purpose in supporting and directing military and paramilitary activi-
ties in and against Nicaragua is to overthrow the government of Nicara-
gua or to force it to change its present structure. Such a purpose is
wholly incompatible with any justification on the grounds of self-defense.
On February 21, 1985, President Reagan was asked whether the re-
moval of the Sandinista government was a goal of his policy. He replied,
"Well, remove in the sense of its present structure." 158 Again, in the
same interview, when asked, "[A]ren't you advocating the overthrow of
the present government?" he said, "Not if the present government would
turn around and say, all right, if they'd say, 'Uncle.' "159 In light of these
statements, earlier references by U.S. spokesmen and legal representa-
tives as to the purpose of arms interdiction or the justification of self-
defense stand exposed as cynical pretexts for a policy of naked and bla-
tant intervention in the affairs of Nicaragua.
In retrospect, it can be seen that the references to self-defense were
manufactured solely to bolster the U.S. position in Nicaragua v. United
States. 1 60 They began to emerge at or about the time Nicaragua's appli-
cation in that case was filed. Before that, although there was much talk
of arms interdiction, it was not placed in the legal category of the justifi-
cation of self-defense. Moreover, since the United States has withdrawn
from the case, references to self-defense have all but ceased.
On a factual level, it must be recognized that the allegations concern-
ing supply and assistance by Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador are
157. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at Al,
col. 2; Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
158. President's News Conference of Feb. 21, 1985, supra note 4, at 212.
159. Id. at 212-13.
160. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Ni.
car. v. U.S.), Judgment of Jurisdiction and Admissibility (dated Nov. 26), 1984 I.C.J. 392.
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simply untrue. Not surprisingly, the United States has failed to produce
any credible evidence either before the International Court of Justice or
in any public forum to substantiate its allegations. In view of the enor-
mous financial and technical resources available to the U.S. intelligence
community, the absence of any evidence is a striking confirmation of
Nicaragua's position. In fact, the available evidence refutes the U.S.
charges and supports Nicaragua's assertion that it has not provided mili-
tary supplies and assistance to the Salvadoran rebels. 161
David C. MaeMichael, a CIA employee who for a period of two years
had overall responsibility in the Agency for assessing and analyzing all
evidence of arms traffic through Nicaragua, has stated:
The whole picture that the Administration has presented of Salvadoran in-
surgent operations being planned, directed and supplied from Nicaragua is
simply not true .... [T]he Administration and the CIA have systemati-
cally misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in the supply of arms to Sal-
vadoran guerrillas to justify its efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan
government. 162
Mr. MacMichael testified before the International Court of Justice that
during his employment with the CIA from 1981 to 1983, there was no
credible evidence that the government of Nicaragua was shipping arms
to the rebels in El Salvador, notwithstanding the extensive and sophisti-
cated intelligence methods employed by the United States precisely to
detect any such arms traffic. Mr. MacMichael described the evidence
that was publicly adduced by the United States on this subject as "very
scanty." "Much of it," he continued, "is unreliable, some of it is suspect,
and I believe it has been presented in a deliberately misleading fashion on
many occasions." 163
This assertion has been substantiated by Pentagon officials and Ameri-
can diplomats. 64 In addition, a number of independent investigations
conducted by American newspapers have failed to discover any evidence
of the alleged arms flow.' 65 It is hard to believe that if there were any
substantial transfer of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador it could be
successfully concealed from all these investigative efforts.
161. L.A. Times, June 16, 1984, at I1, col. 5.
162. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1984, at B6, col. 3.
163. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Verbatim Record, CR 85/21, Sept. 16, 1985, at 22 (Testimony of David
MacMichael) (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
164. Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1986, at A21, col. 6; Boston Globe, June 10, 1984, at Al, col. 4.
165. L.A. Times, June 16, 1984, at Il, col. 5; Boston Globe, June 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1;
Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
Yale Journal of International Law
President Reagan's press statement of February 21, 1985, advocating a
change in the "structure" of the Nicaraguan Government, marked the
abandonment of the pretense that the United States was recruiting,
financing, training, supplying, and directing the contras over the past
four years for the sole purpose of "interdicting" the alleged flow of arms
from Nicaragua to El Salvador. It had become apparent long before
then, however, that the oft-repeated interdiction claim was, for the fol-
lowing reasons, simply a sham:
(a) The very first National Security Council documents accompanying
the plan initially approved by President Reagan in November, 1981, in-
cluded the following statement of purpose:
[To] [b]uild popular support in Central America and Nicaragua for an op-
position front that would be nationalistic, anti-Cuban and anti-Somoza; [to]
[s]upport the opposition front through formation and training of action
teams to collect intelligence and engage in paramilitary and political opera-
tions in Nicaragua and elsewhere; [to] [w]ork primarily through non-Amer-
icans to achieve the foregoing, but in some circumstances the CIA might
(possibly using U.S. personnel) take unilateral paramilitary action against
special Cuban targets. 166
(b) The CIA provided military and financial support to Eden Pastora,
whose forces were based in Costa Rica-to the south and far from any
potential weapons routes to El Salvador-and whose stated objective was
the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. 167
(c) The mining of Nicaragua's harbors in February and March of
1984 had purposes other than the interdiction of weapons traffic. Sena-
tor David Durenberger, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee
and a supporter of aid to the mercenaries, said that the decision to under-
take the mining was based on the need to step up actions against Nicara-
gua "to some higher level with some specialized activity that would put
economic pressure" on the government. 168
(d) Similarly, the preparation and dissemination in 1983 of a manual
giving instructions for attacking and terrorizing civilians and civilian
targets were evidently unconnected with the objective of arms interdic-
tion. The manual specifically directs the guerrillas to "kidnap. . . offi-
cials . . . of the Sandinista government" and "to neutralize carefully
selected and planned targets," including judges, politicians, and state se-
curity officials. 169
166. Wash. Post, May 8, 1983, at All, col. 3.
167. L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at I1, col. 1.
168. Newsday, Apr. 19, 1984, at 3.
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(e) The many attacks carried out against civilians and a wide range of
economic targets, from coffee harvests to oil storage facilities, bear no
relation to arms interdiction.
The striking earlier discrepancy between the Administration's public
words and its private deeds is overwhelmingly confirmed by former mer-
cenary leader Edgar Chamorro. The CIA officials, he said, "always told
us the objective was to overthrow the government in Managua ...
They always said the President of the United States wants you to go to
Managua." 170
Thus, the evidentiary record shows conclusively that self-defense in
any guise, whether as defined under Article 51 or otherwise, was simlply
not a factor in the Administrations's policy calculations. The support of
the guerrillas was conceived from the start as a way of using force to put
pressure on or to overthrow the government of Nicaragua in furtherance
of U.S. national interests, as defined by the Administration. Moreover,
U.S. policymakers were aware from the beginning that the use of force
for such purposes could not be publicly justified even in conventional
political terms, much less as an exercise of self-defense under the norms
of international law. Accordingly, the Administration was forced to use
"covert" action.
With his February, 1985 press conference, President Reagan closed the
gap between what was publicly stated and what was privately known
with regard to U.S. activities in Nicaragua. Every development since
that time has served to confirm and reinforce the President's position as
to the objectives of U.S. policy.171 Only last summer, the Reagan Ad-
ministraton campaigned for and won an additional $27 million for fund-
ing the activities of the mercenaries during the current fiscal year.172 It
now seeks an additional $100 million in aid.173 The express premise of
both campaigns is that without such funding and other forms of U.S.
support and involvement, the United States would be powerless to im-
pose its will upon Nicaragua and to force it to comply with U.S. de-
mands. This premise plainly negates the justification of self-defense
under international law.
Even if arms interdiction had been the purpose of U.S. activities, how-
ever, the justification of self-defense under Article 51 could not be sus-
tained. Article 51 provides that:
170. L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at I1, col. 1.
171. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 21 (the funding was characterized as "humanitarian assistance").
173. See supra note 22.
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the author-
ity and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.17 4
The plain meaning of this Article limits the exercise of the right of self-
defense to situations in which the actor is under armed attack. Henkin
confirms this analysis:
Of course, in the abstract, "if an armed attack occurs," does not have to
mean only if an armed attack occurs. But anyone reading the article, as a
lawyer or as a layman, would read the article as permitting an exception
only if an armed attack occurs. What draftsman or reader would say that a
clause which permits self-defense if an armed attack occurs, really permits
self-defense whether an armed attack occurs or not?175
Labelled the restrictive interpretation of Article 51, the view espoused
by Henkin is adhered to by a majority of publicists. 176 In his Hague
lectures, Judge Manfred Lachs of the International Court of Justice af-
firmed both the validity and the importance of this interpretation:
"'Armed attack'" must be ascertained; it must be clear that it was
launched. With the present means of verification this should present no
difficulties, but there must be no shadow of doubt, for practice has
demonstrated that false alerts may occur: and they may lead to disas-
ter." 177 Although Judge Lachs was referring specifically to nuclear
weapons, the point is equally valid in this context. Any circumvention of
the armed attack limitation endangers the peace and security of the inter-
national system, at the regional as well as the global level.
174. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
175. Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 57
PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 147, 166 (1963) (emphasis in original).
176. See, ag., Alfaro, La Question de la Definition de l'Agression, 29 REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENcES DIPLOMATIQUES 369, 374 (1951); Baxter, The Legal Conse-
quences of the Unlawful Use of Force Under the Charter, 62 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 68, 69
(1968); Bishop, supra note 154, at 428; H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 964 (1953); I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 271; Chaumont, Cours Giniral de Droit InternationalPublic, 129
HAGUE RECUEIL 333, 403 (1970); Falk, The New States and International Legal Order, 118
HAGUE RECUEIL 47 (1966); L. HENKIN, supra note 154, at 139-45; H. KELSEN, supra note
154, at 54; Lachs, supra note 62, at 162; Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of the "State of
War," 62 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 58, 62 (1968); C. ROUSSEAU, LE DROIT DES CONFLITS
ARMfS 535-36 (1983); Scelle, Quelques Reflexions sur l'Abolition de la Compitence de Guerre,
58 REVUE GtNARALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 5 (1954); Schachter, supra note
120, at 1633-35; Schwebel supra note 54, at 449.
177. Lachs, supra note 62, at 164.
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Perhaps the most striking example of the armed attack limitation on
the right of self-defense is to be found in the deliberate refusal of the
United States to justify its quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in terms of self-defense. Professor Chayes, who was Legal Advisor
to the State Department during the crisis, writes that "[t]he self-defense
argument... was never officially espoused in the Cuban affair. On the
contrary, it was repeatedly and consciously rejected." 178 He further ex-
plains that, although part of the reason for the U.S. position was its un-
willingness to set a dangerous precedent, the larger "difficulty with the
Article 51 argument was that it seemed to trivialize the whole effort at
legal justification," precisely because it would have allowed the United
States to be judge in its own case. 179 The ultimate result would be that
"[w]henever a nation believed that interests, which in the heat and pres-
sure of a crisis it is prepared to characterize as vital, were threatened, its
use of force in response would become permissible."' 80
If the United States refused to regard the Soviet placement of missiles
in Cuba-nuclear warheads aimed directly at its territory-as an armed
attack, the actions charged against Nicaragua must fall far below the
requirement of Article 51. They do not involve the use of armed forces.
Nicaraguan troops and other forces under its direction and control are
not alleged to be operating outside its borders. It is not even asserted
that Nicaragua is "substantially involved" in the rebel operations in El
Salvador. All that the United States has alleged-without producing a
shred of proof-is that Nicaragua has provided some conventional arms
to the insurgents. Even if true, this would not amount to an "armed
attack" under Article 51.
The justification of self-defense also fails because the procedural re-
quirements stipulated in Article 51 for the exercise of the inherent right
of self-defense have not been met. The Article provides that "[m]easures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council .... ,,181 This require-
ment is not merely a procedural formality, but rather an important addi-
tional limitation on the exercise of the right of self-defense. As Waldock
explains: "[T]he exercise of the right of self-defence is made subject to
the subsequent judgment and control of the international community.
The individual State necessarily decides whether or not to use force in
178. A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRisis 63 (1974).
179. Id. at 65.
180. Id.
181. U.N CHARTER art. 51.
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self-defence but the propriety of its decision is a matter for the United
Nations."182
For example, pursuant to this conception of the reporting requirement,
when the United States dispatched troops to Lebanon in 1958, President
Eisenhower announced, "In conformity with the spirit of the charter, the
United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the Security Coun-
cil . . .,183 The United States has never made the slightest effort to
fulfill the requirement in the present case.
Finally, it is universally agreed that the legitimate exercise of the right
of self-defense under both customary international law and the Charter is
subject to the requirement of proportionality. 184 The application of this
requirement to the facts of the present case would necessarily limit U.S.
activities to Salvadoran territory. Thus, Judge Lachs writes:
The counter-measures envisaged need not be identical in nature to those
against which they are directed. . . but they should be ejusdem generis, are
bound to be proportionate. For example, if the attack did not amount to
incursion into the territory of another State, the same should be true of the
corresponding act of self-defence. 185
Even if U.S. allegations of arms shipments to El Salvador were true,
which they are not, the U.S. response is on a completely different scale.
It comprises at least $100 million in assistance to a mercenary army of
15,000 men operating in and against the territory of Nicaragua, a major
commitment of U.S. military resources for logistics and other support,
and attacks by air, land and sea against economic targets and the civilian
population. This deliberate application of force at extreme levels of vio-
lence and brutality violates the proportionality requirement and as such
is fundamentally incompatible with the very notion of legitimate self-
defense.
IV. Conclusion
Article 2(4) was established in 1945 as an independent legal norm,
binding by its terms on all members of the United Nations. Occasionally
it has been argued, essentially on rebus sic stantibus grounds, that the
prohibition against the use of force has been invalidated, since the UN
machinery for collective security has not operated as originally envi-
sioned. However, the validity of Article 2(4) was never intended and has
never been seriously regarded as contingent on the successful workings of
182. Waldock, supra note 156, at 495.
183. Statement of President Eisenhower, 39 DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1958, at 181.
184. See, eg., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 261-64.
185. Lachs, supra note 62, at 164.
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the United Nations as an organization. Former President of the I.C.J.,
Jimenez de Arechaga, writing in 1958, maintained on the contrary that
the separation of the Article 2(4) prohibition against the use of force
from the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII represented one of the
major strengths of the Charter:
Este principio cuarto configura una obligacidn entre los Estados, que subsiste
en toda su integridad a pesar de cualquier deficiencia o fracaso que pueda
tener el mecanismo de las Naciones Unidas; a pesar de que el Consejo de
Seguridad no adopte una decisidn por culpa del veto, o por cualquier otra
circunstancia, siempre continuard en vigor este precepto entre los Estados.
Recudrdese que el Pacto Briand-Kellog [sic] no establecta mecanismo al-
guno: se limitaba a condenar la guerra y a renunciar a ella. Este pdrrafo 4.,
en sz,' tiene tanta fuerza como el Pacto de Parz&, y es mucho mds perfecto
desde el punto de vista tdcnico 186
Twenty years later, this analysis was confirmed by the passage of the
UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations among States, which Jimenez de Arechaga describes as "con-
firming the independent validity and the continued force of this funda-
mental obligation [Article 2(4)] despite the failings and shortcomings of
the machinery established in the Charter to maintain peace and
security."187
Professor Henkin likewise writes:
[T]he draftsmen of the Charter were not seeking merely to replace "balance
of power" by "collective security"; they were determined, according to the
Preamble, to abolish "the scourge of war." All the evidence is persuasive
that they sought to outlaw war, whether or not the U.N. organization suc-
ceeded in enforcing the law or establishing peace and justice. And none of
the original members, nor any one of the new members, has ever claimed
that the law against the use of force is undesirable now that the United
Nations is not what had been intended.1 88
The International Court of Justice has unequivocally recognized the
overriding validity of the norm against the use of force. In the now cele-
brated passage from the Corfu Channel case, it stated: "The Court can
186. E. JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LAS NAcIONES
UNIDAS 80 (1958) (translation provided by the author):
This fourth principle constitutes an obligation among the States, that exists in all its integ-
rity in spite of any deficiency or failure that the United Nations mechanism might have; in
spite of the Security Council's not adopting a decision due to the veto, or due to any other
reason, this precept will always continue in effect among the States. Remember that the
Briand-Kellogg Pact did not establish any mechanism: it was limited to condemning war
and renouncing it. This paragraph 4, in itself, has as much force as the Paris Pact, and is
much more perfect from the technical point of view.
187. Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 3, at 88.
188. L. HENKIN, supra note 154, at 138.
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only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a
policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses
and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organ-
ization, find a place in international law.'189
Since its inception, Article 2(4) has been the cornerstone, not only of
the United Nations Charter itself, but of the international legal system
constructed upon it. The Article was designed to establish the rule of
law in international affairs by delegitimizing the rule of force, and to
redress the unequal balance of power between great and small nations.
Without it, as the Court has said, intervention would necessarily "be re-
served for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting
the administration of international justice itself."190 It is significant that
only in the forum of the International Court of Justice can Nicaragua
face the United States as an equal, with the outcome of the dispute unaf-
fected by the overwhelming military and economic power of its adver-
sary. The refusal of the United States to appear before the Court
demonstrates unequivocally the current U.S. preference for the rule of
force over the rule of law.
189. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Judgment of Apr. 9) (emphasis
added).
190. Ia
Vol. 11:104, 1985
